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In the wake of the global financial crisis, academics and pol-
icy makers are questioning the relative merits of export-led
growth strategies. Some have argued that many of the con-
ditions responsible for that model’s success are no longer in
place. Many developing countries have relied on an under-
valued real exchange rate to boost their exports. But global
economic prospects are weaker than in the past, and there
is greater uncertainty about the advanced economies’ capac-
ity to continue absorbing developing countries’ exports.
Moreover, a strategy of export-led growth paired with man-
aged undervaluation is likely to incur costs if the real ex-
change rate is kept too low for too long. But how effective
has real devaluation been in boosting exports and growth—
and is it sustainable?
The Role of the Real Exchange Rate in
Boosting Economic Growth in Developing
Countries
In most developing countries, the real exchange rate is man-
aged to various degrees and is largely determined by eco-
nomic policies rather than by market fluctuations. The real
exchange rate depends on the balance between savings and
investment, and on the balance between expenditures and
income. Hence, all policies that produce higher savings rel-
ative to investment can lead to real exchange rate deprecia-
tion.
Governments have a variety of policy instruments avail-
able to achieve a competitive real exchange rate and, poten-
tially, real undervaluation. Examples include a moderate
fiscal consolidation in the presence of a low level of private
absorption; the introduction of capital controls on capital
inflows and the liberalization of capital outflows; targeted
interventions on foreign exchange markets; and a nominal
depreciation associated with anti-inflationary policies, such
as price and wage moderation.
Empirical evidence shows that real exchange rate varia-
tions can affect growth outcomes. Faster economic growth
is significantly associated with real exchange rate deprecia-
tion (Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik [2005], based on an
analysis of more than 80 episodes of growth acceleration be-
tween 1957 and 1992). Real overvaluation hampers exports
A policy of managed real undervaluation may have been an important factor behind the success of East Asia’s
export-led growth model. But current discussions over the value of China’s currency demonstrate the controversy
this kind of policy can generate. Although a managed real undervaluation can enhance domestic competitiveness, it
is difficult to sustain—both economically and politically—in the post-crisis environment. We show that a real
undervaluation works only for low-income countries, and only in the medium term. and leads to a fall in economic growth (Easterly 2005; John-
son, Ostry, and Subramanian 2007). 
Rodrik (2009) argues that real undervaluation promotes
economic growth, increases the profitability of the tradables
sector, and leads to an expansion of the share of tradables in
domestic value added. He claims that the tradables sector in
developing countries can be too small because it suffers
more than the nontradables sector from institutional weak-
nesses and market failures. A real exchange rate undervalu-
ation works as a second-best policy to compensate for the
negative effects of these distortions by enhancing the sector’s
profitability. Higher profitability promotes investment in the
tradables sector, which then expands, and promotes eco-
nomic growth.
Other researchers showed alternative channels for under-
valuation of the real exchange rate to raise growth. Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2007) claim that an undervalued
real exchange rate boosts output and productivity growth not
through an expansion of the tradables sector, but through an
increase in savings and capital accumulation. Korinek and
Servén (2010) show that real exchange rate undervaluation
can raise growth through learning-by-doing externalities in
the tradables sector—externalities that are suboptimally pro-
duced in the absence of policy intervention. They suggest that
foreign reserves accumulation lowers the real exchange rate
and encourages learning-by-doing externalities of export-led
growth without the need for direct subsidies. However, this
impact is reduced as more countries embrace such a strategy. 
However, a competing strand of the literature claims that
large misalignments of the real exchange rate from its equi-
librium hamper economic growth. Its proponents define the
equilibrium real exchange rate as the rate that guarantees
macroeconomic equilibrium in the medium term. They
argue  that  a  real  overvaluation  causes  current  account
deficits and can lead to currency crises, whereas a real un-
dervaluation causes inflation and can lead to an overheating
of the economy. They also assert that the real exchange rate
should be determined only by market forces and that large
misalignments generate distortions, produce wrong signals
to economic agents, lead to factor misallocation, and cause
instability.  Consistent  with  this  literature,  Aguirre  and
Calderón (2005) show that both large real exchange rate
overvaluation and large real exchange rate devaluations
hamper economic growth. The larger the misalignments, the
larger is the decline in growth.
Evidence of the Positive Impact of Real
Exchange Rate Undervaluation on GDP
Growth and Export Expansion
We provide further evidence on the links among the real ex-
change rate, economic growth, and export expansion follow-
ing Rodrik (2009). Real undervaluation has a positive effect
on economic growth and on export expansion, but this effect
is significant only for countries with low per capita income.
In  developing  countries  with  per  capita  incomes  below
$2,500, an increase of 50 percent in real undervaluation is
associated with an annual 1.7 percent increase in growth (fig-
ure 1) and an annual 1.8 percent increase in exports over
GDP (figure 2) in the corresponding five-year period.1
In the long run, the effect of a real exchange rate under-
valuation on economic growth becomes negative; and on ex-
ports, it becomes insignificant. An extended specification of
the model (which includes the lagged effect of undervalua-
tion) shows that in developing countries with per capita in-
comes below $2,500, real undervaluation has a positive
contemporaneous effect on growth but a negative lagged ef-
fect. In developing countries with per capita incomes lower
than $6,000 and higher than $2,500, real undervaluation
has an insignificant contemporaneous effect and a negative
lagged effect on growth. Real undervaluation has only a pos-
itive contemporaneous effect on exports; its lagged effect on
exports is insignificant for all income levels.
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Figure 1. Impact of 50 Percent Real Undervaluation on Growth of
Annual Per Capita Income
percent
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Note: All coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level, but the
coefficient for countries with real per capita incomes between $2,500 and
$6,000 is not significant.


























Figure 2. Impact of 50 Percent real undervaluation on the Exports-
to-GDP Ratio
percent
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Note: All coefficients are significant either at the 1 percent or at the 5
percent level, but the coefficient for countries with real per capita incomes
between $2,500 and $6,000 is not significant. Real Exchange Rate Variability and 
Economic Growth 
Perhaps more important than the level of the real exchange
rate is its variability. An unstable real exchange rate causes
more volatile relative prices, creates uncertainty, increases
risk, and shortens investment horizons. Large real exchange
rate misalignments do not provide the right incentives for
investment over time, and they negatively affect the quality
of investment. Frequent shifting of resources between the
tradables and nontradables sectors in response to recurrent
changes in relative prices leads to higher adjustment costs.
Frequent movements in exchange rate expectations cause
interest rate volatility and financial instability.
A volatile real exchange rate reduces the profitability of
firms and hampers economic growth. But the final effect of
real exchange rate volatility on economic performance can
also depend on complementary factors, such as political and
macroeconomic stability (Eichengreen 2008). The effect of
this variability on economic growth depends crucially on the
level of financial sector development. When financial markets
are sufficiently developed, agents can use sophisticated finan-
cial instruments to hedge against risk (Aghion et al. 2009). 
Previous research on the impact of exchange rate volatil-
ity on growth has reached contrasting results. Ghosh et al.
(1997) find that exchange rate variability does not affect
economic growth. Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) find that
exchange rate instability negatively affects investment in
Sub-Saharan African countries. Bosworth, Collins, and Yu-
chin (1995) provide evidence that in a large sample of in-
dustrial  and  developing  countries,  real  exchange  rate
volatility hampers economic growth and reduces productiv-
ity growth. Aghion et al. (2009) find a similar result, but
they also show that the negative effect of real exchange rate
volatility on economic growth shrinks in countries with
higher levels of financial development. Servén (2003) shows
that real exchange rate volatility negatively affects invest-
ment in a large panel of developing countries. This negative
impact is significantly larger in countries with highly open
economies and less developed financial systems. He also
finds evidence of threshold effects, whereby uncertainty only
matters when it is relatively high.
The literature concerning the effects of real exchange rate
volatility on export expansion in developing countries also
has not reached a clear-cut consensus. Arize, Osang, and
Slottje (2000) find a significant negative relationship be-
tween an increase in exchange rate volatility and exports in
developing countries. Chit, Rizov, and Willenbockel (2010)
find a similar result for a panel of East Asian countries. Sauer
and Bohara (2001) show that volatility has significant neg-
ative effects on exports in Latin America and Africa, but not
in Asia. They argue that the effect of real exchange rate
volatility on exports depends on the type of goods and the
countries involved. Some studies also show that exchange
rate variability has no significant effect in driving export vol-
umes (Klein 1990; Mckenzie 1998).
Evidence of the Negative Impact of Real
Exchange Rate Volatility on GDP Growth and
Export Expansion
A stable real exchange rate is a necessary condition for devel-
oping countries to achieve sustained economic growth, but
only large fluctuations matter for exports. Our evidence con-
firms the existence of a significant negative relationship be-
tween real exchange rate volatility and real per capita GDP
growth (figure 5).2 This relationship does not significantly
change when observations with extremely high real exchange
rate volatility are dropped. Indeed, it becomes even stronger.
Our evidence also confirms the existence of a significant neg-
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Figure 3. Impact of 50 Percent Real Undervaluation on Annual
Growth of Per Capita Income
percent
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Note: All coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level, except for the
contemporaneous coefficient for countries with real per capita GDP
between $2,500 and $6,000, which is not significant. 
lagged effect contemporaneous effect


























Figure 4. Impact of 50 Percent Real Undervaluation on Annual
Exports-to-GDP Ratio
percent
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Note: All lagged coefficients are not significant. All contemporaneous
coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level, except for the
contemporaneous coefficient for countries with real per capita GDP
between $2,500 and $6,000, which is significant at the 10 percent level. 
lagged effect contemporaneous effectative relationship between real exchange rate variability and
the exports-to-GDP ratio (figure 6). However, this relation-
ship is no longer significant when observations with extremely
high real exchange rate volatility are dropped. Only large real
exchange rate variability appears to matter for exports. 
Maintaining an Undervalued Real Exchange
Rate over Time Is Not Sustainable
A stable and undervalued real exchange rate can be a key el-
ement in promoting economic growth in low-income coun-
tries; but maintaining this policy for too long may have
significant adverse consequences. First, such a policy may
cause an excessive accumulation of low-yielding foreign re-
serves, which is an inefficient outcome. The return produced
by foreign reserves is lower than the return produced by the
same amount of wealth invested either in infrastructure or in
a well-diversified portfolio in international financial markets.
Second, a real undervaluation led by nominal deprecia-
tion and not associated with anti-inflationary policies (such
as price and wage moderation) can cause high and destabi-
lizing liquidity growth and inflation. It also can lead to fi-
nancial instability. 
Third, an undervalued rate can constrain monetary policy,
leaving it no longer free to target domestic objectives. Such
constraint may cause an artificial process of overlending and
overinvestment, mainly in the presence of an open capital
account. The result can be an overheating economy.
Fourth, maintaining an undervalued real exchange rate
for a long period of time may reduce the incentives to create
a more developed financial sector.
Fifth, an artificial undervaluation is akin to a subsidy for
firms that produce tradable goods. The subsidy is paid for
by an implicit tax on consumers, who consequently have re-
duced purchasing power.
Finally, it may be difficult to exit a policy of sustained un-
dervaluation once it becomes necessary to do so. Governments
may be pressured by influential lobbies (that is, tradable goods
producers) who derive rents from the status quo. 
A stable and undervalued real exchange rate is a key step
in promoting economic growth, but by no means is it a suf-
ficient condition. The adoption of managed undervaluation
as a policy aimed at enhancing sustainable growth should be
preceded by an in-depth analysis of its welfare implications.
Policy makers must be aware that the costs of such a policy
may outweigh the benefits in the medium to long term. To
be successful, this policy must be accompanied by other nec-
essary and complementary conditions, such as strong insti-
tutions and macroeconomic stability. A country must be
prepared to exit before costs begin outweighing benefits—
a process that can be done by announcing a clear exit plan
when the policy is adopted. To reduce the negative growth
effects of possible real overvaluation and of higher real ex-
change rate volatility, it is best to move away from this policy
strategy when the economy is still strong and confidence is
high. 
Notes
1. Closely following Rodrik (2009) and using the Penn
World Tables 6.3 data (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2009)
for the period 1950–2004, we first compute a measure of
real undervaluation for a panel of 187 countries and then
estimate the effects of real undervaluation on per capita in-
come growth for a panel of developing countries. We define
“developing countries” as those countries with GDP per
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Figure 5. Impact of Real Exchange Rate Variability on Growth
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Note: The graph presents the cross-country relationship between average
real per capita GDP growth and real exchange rate volatility for countries
with per capita incomes of less than $6,000 between 1980 and 2004.
Coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level.
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Figure 6. Impact of Real Exchange Rate Variability on Exports
Source: Authors’ estimates. 
Note: The graph presents the cross-country relationship between average
exports as a percent of GDP and real exchange rate volatility for countries
with per capita income less than $6,000 between 1980 and 2004.
Coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level, but not significant if
observations with real exchange rate variability above 0.4 percent are
dropped. 






0capita incomes lower than $6,000. For each time-series, we
take a five-year average. This generates a maximum of 11
five-year time periods for each country. The real undervalu-
ation index is a measure of the deviation of the actual real
exchange rate from the purchasing power parity real ex-
change rate, which takes into account the Balassa-Samuelson
effect—that is, the fact that the relative price of nontradable
goods is higher in countries with higher per capita incomes.
The real undervaluation index is computed as the residual
of a panel regression of the real exchange rate on real GDP
per capita and time-fixed effects. The real exchange rate is
defined as the ratio of the nominal exchange rate to the pur-
chasing power parity conversion factor. To capture the ef-
fects of real undervaluation on growth, we estimate a panel
regression of GDP per capita growth on the real exchange
rate undervaluation index, the level of initial income, and
time- and country-fixed effects. To capture the effects of real
undervaluation on export expansion, we estimate a panel
regression of export over GDP on the real exchange rate un-
dervaluation index, the level of real income per capita, and
time- and country-fixed effects.
2. This finding is based on estimates of the relationship
between real exchange rate volatility—measured as the stan-
dard deviation of RER (defined as the ratio between the
nominal exchange rate and purchasing power parity)—and
average real GDP per capita growth in a panel of countries
with GDP per capita incomes lower than $6,000 between
1980 and 2004.
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